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Abstract: In order to adapt to the changes in the shipping economy, both 
the EU and the US have reformed their antitrust exemption regimes. However, 
they are in different stages of their reforms. For instance, the EU has repealed the 
antitrust exemption for liner conferences after due investigation; in contrast, the 
US still acknowledges such exemptions while imposing strict restrictions on them. 
Nevertheless, both the US and the EU have actively granted antitrust exemptions 
to consortia agreements, as well as new business frameworks of cooperation 
between liner services operators like consortia. Considering the reforms in the 
EU and the US and the current status of legislations in China, China’s shipping 
legislation should be grounded in its own shipping economy and should remove 
the stipulations scattered in the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China 
on International Maritime Transportation. Endeavoring to be consistent with the 
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, China should specify and 
improve its antitrust exemption rules for ocean shipping while drawing lessons 
from the reforms carried out in the EU and the US. Furthermore, it should make 
plain at the theoretical level that, when China’s shipping economy turns mature, 
it should move towards placing strict limitations on, or abolishing, its antitrust 
exemption regime for ocean shipping.
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I. The Antitrust Exemption Regime for Ocean Shipping
A. Antitrust Exemption Regime
Antitrust law, falling under the category of economic laws, aims to administer 
markets or regulate the operation of markets.1 It mainly governs certain subjects’ 
(or doers’) elimination or restriction of competition in economic activities in the 
market. Such restrictions and obstruction of competition are generally called “trust” 
or “monopoly”. However, not all monopolistic behaviors (or restrictive practices) 
are absolutely harmful. In fact, many behaviors which hinder competition are 
allowed by laws, since their accompanying benefits offset or outweigh the harm 
that they bring to competition.2 In order to find a balance between the need to 
boost economic development and the necessity to overcome the problems caused 
by trust, an antitrust exemption regime is created. The academic community fails 
to reach a consensus on the concept of antitrust exemption regime,3 nevertheless, 
there is little dispute with respect to the purpose of creating such a regime. That is, 
this regime is developed to supplement antitrust laws. When remarking on British 
economic policies, Alfred Marshall, a British economist, said that considering all 
kinds of monopolies as evil was a simplification without justification, which would 
jeopardize the economic development of the U.K.4 Thus, it can be concluded that 
the antitrust exemption regime constitutes a crucial part of antitrust laws, which 
further highlights the differences between a legal and illegal monopoly (trust). 
B. An Overview of the Antitrust Exemption Regime 
    for the Shipping Sector
It is well-known that the shipping industry involves high risk, especially in 
1     Li Changqi ed., Economic Law, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law 
Press, 1997, p. 38. (in Chinese)
2       Zheng Tai’an and Zheng Hong et al., Studies on the Anti-monopoly Legal System, Chengdu: 
Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 2008, p. 193. (in Chinese)
3       Antitrust exemption primarily refers to the fact that laws allow certain dominant position or 
monopolistic behaviors to exist in particular industries or sectors, i.e., it is a legal regime 
where antitrust laws allow certain coordinated or concerted practices, even though they 
restrict competition. See You Quanrong ed., Comparative Studies on Anti-monopoly Law, 
Beijing: People’s Court Press, 2006, p. 202. (in Chinese)
4       Yang Lanpin, A Study on Monopoly Issues in the Transformation Stage in China, Economic 
Review, No. 4, 1999, p. 48. (in Chinese) 
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an era when marine technology was underdeveloped. At that time, ships were 
less capable of withstanding natural disasters, accidents and other risks. In case 
of contingencies, ships and goods on board would sink to the seabed and the 
relevant investment would be lost. For these reasons, the shipping industry found 
it difficult to raise funds and experienced a downturn for a considerable period 
of time. The endeavors made at that time proved that joint operation of shipping 
companies was a new means for the development of the shipping industry. For 
example, in 1875, due to the increasingly fiercer market competition after World 
War II, liner conferences were established one after another, aiming to coordinate 
actions to prevent excessive competition and mitigate operation risks.5 After that, 
the mode of joint operations became diversified along with the growing of ocean 
shipping capacity. Liner conferences, freight agreements, shipping consortia (such 
as giant shipping consortia) and other forms of associations emerged during the 
process,6 and this greatly impacted the international cargo transportation sector, 
even the shipping sector, as a whole. The transformation and development of 
the competition form in the international shipping sector effectively guaranteed 
the smooth development of trade, as well as the gradual stability of the shipping 
market. Therefore, a majority of States allow some monopolistic behaviors in the 
ocean shipping sector. That is, some monopolistic behaviors are given exemptions 
from antitrust laws, and cooperation between certain shipping companies is rarely 
interfered with. However, it does not imply that the inherent monopolistic and 
anti-competitive traits of such behaviors can be ignored. One the one hand, laws 
cannot ignore the disruption of competition that monopoly of shipping companies 
has caused; on the other hand, imposing excessive limitations on alliances between 
shipping companies to fight against operation risks is unacceptable for the sake of 
economic development. Hence, how to balance the need to prohibit monopoly and 
the need to promote joint operations to improve the competitiveness of shipping 
companies constitutes a difficult question in legislative and judicial practice for 
every State. And, because of this, States are actively reforming and exploring the 
antitrust exemption regime for the ocean shipping sector. 
5     Zhang Hui, The Recent Change of International Maritime Transport Competition and Its 
Legal Regulation, Journal of Wuhan University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition), 
No. 2, 2009, p. 55. (in Chinese)
6      Sun Yongzhi, Comparative Research on Operating Models of International Shipping 
Consolidations, Journal of Qingdao Ocean Shipping Mariners College, No. 4, 2004, p. 35. 
(in Chinese)
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II. A Study of the Antitrust Exemption Regimes 
     in the EU and the US
A. The Antitrust Exemption Regime in the EU
As described above, in an era during which marine technology and shipping 
economy were underdeveloped, ocean shipping was a distinctive industry without 
big return but requiring much investment. Additionally, shipping companies’ 
vying for resources usually led to excessive competition in the market and freight 
fluctuations, which further created obstacles for shipping companies to receive 
scale economies effect. Considering such features of the shipping industry, and in 
order to stabilize the freight rate and market and to provide shippers and cargo-
owners with regular sailing timetables and other shipping services, the Council of 
the European Community (hereinafter “Council”) decided to exempt the shipping 
sector from the regulation imposed by general competition rules, and to formulate 
a competition law for maritime transport that is compatible with its features. Under 
the context, the Council adopted the Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 
December 1986 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty to maritime transport (hereinafter “Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86”),7 
which, in essence, was a regulation exempting agreements on maritime transport 
from general competition rules if the specified conditions were satisfied.8 However, 
the Regulation cannot be considered as granting a full exemption without any 
restriction whatsoever. Pursuant to the Regulation, shipping monopolistic behaviors 
may be exempted from competition rules; nonetheless, the concerned shipping 
company’s or carrier’s abuse of its dominant position or status as an undertaking 
enjoying exemption should be prohibited by law. Consequently, the exemption 
referred to in the Regulation should be deemed as a relative one, with conditions 
attached, rather than absolute.  
Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 provides for the exemption for 
7      OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime 
transport.
8      Wang Qiuwen, The Legislation of China’s Shipping Anti-Monopoly Rules: Using EU 
Shipping Competition Law Reform for Reference, Journal of Ocean University of China 
(Social Sciences), No. 2, 2013, p. 32. (in Chinese)
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technical agreements, i.e., the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community (hereinafter “Treaty”) shall not 
apply to agreements, decisions and concerted practices whose sole object and 
effect is to achieve technical improvements or cooperation.9 Article 3 provides 
for the exemption for agreements between members of liner conferences, that 
is, agreements, decisions and concerted practices between the members of one 
or more liner conferences are exempted from the prohibition under Article 85(1) 
of the Treaty, when they have as their objective the fixing of rates and capacity 
regulation, and other specified objects.10 The exemptions for technical agreements 
and agreements between members of liner conferences under Articles 2 & 3 form 
the most important part of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86. 
In order to improve the antitrust exemption regime for maritime transport, and 
deal with the emergence of joint operation of shipping companies and to protect 
such operations, the Commission of European Union (hereinafter “Commission”) 
adopted Commission Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty11 to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices between liner shipping companies (consortia),12 which grants special 
exemption from competition rules in respect of agreements between liner shipping 
companies (consortia). Based on these regulations, the EU has gradually developed 
an antitrust exemption regime particularly for the maritime transport sector. 
The antitrust exemption regime for the shipping sector, while benefiting 
the members of consortia between shipping companies, including members of 
9      OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime 
transport.
10    OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime 
transport.
11    Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty provides: the provisions of Article 81(1) may, however, be 
declared inapplicable in the case of any agreement or category of agreements between 
undertakings, any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, any 
concerted practice or category of concerted practices, (1) which contributes to improving 
the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, 
(2) while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and (3) which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition.
12     Commission Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Trea-
ty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner 
shipping companies (consortia).
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liner conferences, has obviously brought about negative impact. It happened 
when independent carriers and cargo-owners grew in strength day by day, and 
independent carriers’ calls for fair market competition and cargo-owners’ require-
ment for having equal status with carriers as parties to contracts on international 
carriage of goods became more intense. Under this context, the EU, a global 
shipping giant, became skeptical about its antitrust exemption regime for the ship-
ping sector, and assessed and reviewed the regime to determine its legitimacy 
in 2003. In 2004, the EU released the White Paper on the Review of Regulation 
4056/86,13 believing that the regulation was incompatible with the general antitrust 
exemption rules contained in Article 81 of the Treaty. Therefore, it decided to 
consider repealing the current antitrust exemption for liner conferences as speci-
fied in the regulation, and exempting any new business framework of cooperation 
between liner services operators, such as consortia and alliances, from competition 
rules, or to take into account any alternative system which may better reflect fair 
competition between carriers and balance the interests of carriers and shippers. 
Under the guidance of the White Paper, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 
1419/2006 in September 2006,14 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 which 
exempted liner conferences from antitrust rules.15 16 In accordance with Regulation 
(EC) No 1419/2006, the antitrust exemption for agreements between members of 
liner conferences was officially repealed in 2008, which means that the exemption 
for liner conferences granted by the UN Convention on a Code of Conduct for 
Liner Conferences, 1974,17 would not apply to EU liners. The EU contended that 
liner conferences were not born with the immunity to antitrust rules and that they 
should comply with general competition rules. In addition, due to liner conferences’ 
increasing abuse of their dominant role, they would, if not effectively controlled, 
13    White Paper on the Review of Regulation 4056/86, applying EC competition rules to mari-
time transport.
14   OJ L 269, 28.9.2006, Council Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006 of 25 September 2006 
repealing Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport, and amending Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 as regards the extension of its scope to include cabotage and international tramp 
services.
15      OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime 
transport.
16     Jia Binggui, New System of EU Shipping Competition Rules, Journal of Shanghai Mari-
time University, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2009, p. 84. (in Chinese)
17     Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 1974, at http://www.china.com.cn
/law/flfg/txt/2006-08/08/content_7057224.htm, 15 July 2014.
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go beyond the limits defined by the antitrust exemption regime, and bring about 
adverse effects.18 Hence, the regulation is adopted to maintain market competition 
in order by limiting the antitrust exemption for liner conferences. In view of the 
historic stage where the current shipping economy stands, the EU’s repealing 
of exemption for liner conferences shocked the world. However, the continuous 
progress of the shipping sector may demonstrate that this move of the EU is 
possibly a milestone in the evolution of shipping legislations. 
However, the EU did not adopt such strong measures against all business 
frameworks of cooperation between liner services operators. Instead, the EU 
treated the new business frameworks of cooperation between international liner 
services operators, like shipping consortia, with leniency. The Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 870/95 of 1995, granting the relevant consortia block 
exemption from competition rules of the European Community,19 confirmed the 
shipping consortia’s exemption from antitrust rules through legislation. This 
Regulation has been successively amended by other regulations, one of which 
is the Commission Regulation (EC) No 611/2005 of 2005.20 The latter provides 
that the rules applicable to shipping consortia should be extended till April, 2010, 
and a block exemption for consortia would be continued. It indicates that despite 
amendments to the regime regarding its applicability to consortia, the essentials of 
the regime have not been changed significantly. Meanwhile, it should be noted that 
the EU accepted the cooperation between members of consortia for the purpose 
of complementing each other’s strengths; nevertheless, it adopted a tough attitude 
towards their cooperation on freight rates and capacity control by prohibiting 
consortia from reaching consensus on freight rates and capacity. The amendments 
described above, coupled with EU’s surprising repeal of exemptions for liner 
conferences, cause people to speculate regarding the tendency of exemptions for 
18    Xu Jun, On the EU’s Review of the Antitrust Exemption for Liner Conferences, China 
Oceans Law Review, No. 2, 2005, p. 203. (in Chinese)
19    Zhang Hui, The Recent Change of International Maritime Transport Competition and Its 
Legal Regulation, Journal of Wuhan University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition), 
No. 2, 2009, p. 59. (in Chinese)
20    Commission Regulation (EC) No 611/2005 of 20 April 2005 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 823/2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories 
of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies 
(consortia).
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consortia. Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 21 offered an answer to it – 
the regime of antitrust exemption for shipping consortia would continue to shoulder 
the historical mission to promote the development of the shipping economy. 
Likewise, the EU also recognized the role of shipping consortia. In June, 2014, 
the Commission decided to extend the application of antitrust exemption rules 
for shipping alliances, and extend the application of the special rules concerning 
the review of antitrust exemption for shipping alliances, which satisfy particular 
conditions, for a further five years, i.e., until 2020. After consulting with all the 
parties concerned, the Commission asserted that the existing exemption rules 
may provide a stable legal environment to consortia agreements which benefit 
consumers, instead of distorting the market. It therefore decided to extend the 
application of such rules.22 The EU’s attitude towards the granting of exemption 
for liner conferences, consortia, and shipping alliances indicates that the decision 
to exempt business frameworks of cooperation between liner services operators 
from competition rules should be treated on a case by case basis. In other words, 
exemptions should or should not be given only after taking into account the specific 
form of joint operation between shipping companies and the different action taken 
under the corresponding operation mode.  
B. The Antitrust Exemption Regime in the US
Similar to the antitrust exemption regime envisaged in EU competition 
laws for maritime transport, the exemption regime initially outlined by the US’ 
Ocean Shipping Act of 1916 23 is established to prevent vicious competition in the 
shipping market. In addition, the exemption regime in the US shows a feature of 
balancing the interests between shipowners and cargo owners. The rationale behind 
this feature is that US shipping policies prefer to protect the interests of cargo 
owners as a matter of priority. However, the need to promote the construction of 
21    Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 of 28 September 2009 on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices between liner shipping companies (consortia).
22    Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Mission of the People’s Republic of 
China to the European Union: Extension of Antitrust Exemption Rules for EU Shipping 
Consortia, at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/dxfw/jlyd/201406/20140600642669.
shtml, 20 July 2014. (in Chinese)
23    See Federal Maritime Commission: The Ocean Shipping Act of 1916, (46 U.S.C. § 815 
Second).
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US mer-chant fleet calls for a regime adjusting the imbalance between the carriers’ 
and shippers’ interests. And antitrust exemption rules for maritime transport just 
assume the role of adjusting such an imbalance. Nonetheless, numerous drawbacks 
have been found during the implementation of the antitrust exemption regime for 
ocean shipping under the Ocean Shipping Act of 1916. Such drawbacks mainly 
include complicated approval procedures and unclear stipulations concerning the 
eligibility conditions for exemption. Due to such drawbacks, carrier conferences 
cannot really enjoy antitrust exemption and are often subject to antitrust review.24 
Therefore, the Ocean Shipping Act of 1984 (hereinafter “Act of 1984”) assumes 
one of the key tasks of specifying the conditions that a common carrier needs to 
satisfy in order to be exempt from antitrust rules and to simplify the relevant filing 
procedures.25 Additionally, the Act of 1984 was formulated for the legislative 
purpose of further balancing the interests of carriers and shippers, which is the 
core of the development of US shipping laws. Nevertheless, the implementation 
history of the Act of 1984 proves that the antitrust exemption for ocean shipping, 
particularly for liner conferences, has negatively affected, to some extent, the 
environment for competition in the US international shipping market. Therefore, 
at the beginning of a new wave of reforms in shipping acts, many people in the 
US, even the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
proposed to repeal the exemptions for liner conferences. However, the Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (hereinafter “OSRA”) still reserved the antitrust 
exemption rules, because it was believed that repealing antitrust exemption at a 
time when the shipping economy was not mature enough would surely reduce 
transportation productivity.26 Yet, in order to appease the dissenting opinions in 
the US, OSRA made a compromise by imposing strict limitations on the antitrust 
exemptions for liner conferences.
OSRA aims to encourage the liberalization of the US’ shipping market while 
protecting the interests of its domestic shipping sector. Section 2 of OSRA can 
reflect this aim in a vivid way: Section 2 provides that the development of shipping 
economy should be promoted by placing a greater reliance on the marketplace, 
24    Yu Shicheng, On Shipping Act of the USA (Doctoral Dissertation), Shanghai: East China 
University of Politics and Law, 2006, p. 28. (in Chinese)
25      See Federal Maritime Commission: The Ocean Shipping Act of 1984, (46 U.S.C §§ 40101-
41309).
26     Market Information Department of COSCO Container Lines Co., Ltd., An Introduction to 
Antitrust Exemption Rules for Ocean Shipping Industry, Containerization, No. 10, 2000, p. 
20. (in Chinese)
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and the US import and export trade should be protected by encouraging benign 
competition between shipping companies, and raising the level of market compe-
tition by transport efficiency improved during the companies’ pursuit of compe-
titive edge.27 Although the antitrust exemption regime for ocean shipping still 
has the feature of limiting competition to some extent, and is therefore not fully 
consistent with the aim stated above, OSRA did not abolish the regime, but only 
restricted antitrust exemption by flexibly taking legislative and law enforcement 
initiatives. On the legislative level, OSRA lays down its provisions concerning 
antitrust immunity for the shipping sector, clearly stipulating what antitrust laws 
should apply to and what such laws should not apply to.28 Section 7, paragraphs 
(a)(1)~(6), provides the circumstances where antitrust laws do not apply in 
general,29 which primarily include agreements required to be filed pursuant to legal 
regulations, agreements permitted by other laws and concerted activities conducted 
for performing agreements. Taking the antitrust exemption for liner conferences for 
example, Section 4 of OSRA provides that fixing of transportation rates by liner 
conferences jointly violates antitrust laws;30 however, the rules of OSRA indicate 
that rate-setting arrangements and the relevant practice may be exempt from 
antitrust laws if they satisfy the exemption conditions under Section 7 and have 
completed the relevant filing procedures. Despite this, such exemptions are imposed 
with stringent limitations. In addition to the completion of the filing procedures 
stated above, the conferences must also allow, rather than greatly interfering 
with, any “individual actions”31 taken by any one of their members if the relevant 
conditions are met. Moreover, in order to protect the US interests and competition 
in the shipping market, OSRA also excludes the US domestic transportation and 
agreements from antitrust exemptions, and gives limited exemp-tions for liner 
27    See Section 2 of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L No. 105-258, 112 stat, 
1902-1917.
28     Yu Shicheng ed., Compilation of Laws and Regulations of U.S. Maritime Administration, 
Beijing: Peking University Press, 2008, pp. 232~233. (in Chinese)
29    See FMC: The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L No. 105-258, 112 stat, 1902-
1917.
30      Art. 4 of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998. 
31    “Individual action” referred to herein means that a member of the conference, subject to 
conditions like sending reasonable notification, shall have the right to conclude a contract 
with the shipper alone, which may cover issues like changing freight rates. The conference 
should not limit such a right enjoyed by the shipping company.  
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conferences.32 Further, when enforcing laws, the US imposes strict limitations 
on antitrust exemptions for business frameworks of cooperation between liner 
services operators. When assessing whether to grant antitrust exemption or not, the 
Federal Maritime Commission (hereinafter “FMC”) will, in light of its authority 
and the application submitted to it, grant exemption for a freight agreement and 
other concerted activities if FMC believes that they will not exert adverse impacts 
on freight fluctuation, joining of new carriers (shipping companies), and the 
development and application of shipping technology; the FMC will refuse the 
application or grant conditional exemption, if the above exemption conditions 
are not satisfied, specifically, if such agreement and practices substantially curb 
competition and prejudice shipping interests. In order to limit antitrust exemptions 
in the shipping sector and protect US trades, FMC, after granting antitrust 
exemption, is entitled to review agreements and practices that impair competition, 
and may request injunctions against agreements that cause unreasonable reduction 
of transportation services or unjustified raise of transportation costs.33
Like EU, the US adopts a lenient attitude toward antitrust exemption for 
new business frameworks of cooperation between liner services operators (such 
as consortia agreements and consortia), except those fixing freight rates and 
controlling capacity. In the meantime, the US also actively gives guidance for the 
change of liner conference agreements into consortia agreements, and encourages 
liner conferences to transform into new business frameworks of cooperation 
between liner services operators, as evidenced in the report on The Impact of 
the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 34 prepared by FMC. Specifically, the 
antitrust exemptions for conferences agreements are declining. The carrier enjoys 
antitrust exemption with respect to rate levels mainly through concluding non-
mandatory freight agreements.35 In this connection, the US shipping acts also adopt 
different strategies for antitrust exemption for shipping consortia, in light of the 
distinctive nature of the agreement concluded between them and the unique form 
of competition they are involved in. And the following question is worthy of our 
32     Li Zhen, The Establishment of the Shipping Antitrust Exemption System in China, Collec-
ted Papers of the International Workshop on Maritime Law 2007, p. 404. (in Chinese)
33    Wang Zengkun and Liu Shufen, Analysis on Anti-monopoly Exemption of Liner Conferen-
ce, Research on Waterborne Transportation, No. 4, 2008, p. 29. (in Chinese)
34     See Federal Maritime Commission: The Impact of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, 
at http://www.fmc.gov/assets/1/Page/OSRA_Study.pdf, 25 July 2014.
35     Zi Yan, A Brief Introduction to the FMC “The Impact of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 
1998”, China Ocean Shipping Monthly, No. 4, 2002, p. 72. (in Chinese)
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attention: will the US shipping laws set out more detailed rules concerning the 
antitrust exemption for new business frameworks of cooperation between liner 
services operators like consortia and shipping alliances, or prefer to grant them 
more antitrust exemption? 
C. Summary and Analysis 
Both the EU and the US shipping legislations have staged gradual reforms 
of their antitrust exemptions. However, their reforms are slightly different in that 
the EU is more radical than the US. The reasons are as follows. The shipping 
economy in the EU is strong enough that improving economic efficiency in the 
shipping sector is removed from the list of top priorities of its shipping legislations. 
Instead, the focus of legislation has shifted to the protection of the shipper’s (cargo 
owner’s) equality as a civil and commercial subject, and the creation of a healthy 
environment for competition in the shipping market. Therefore, the EU needs 
to reform the legal provisions which are not sufficiently attuned to the current 
practices in the shipping industry. In contrast, the US, although a State that has a 
tradition of protecting cargo owner’s interests, also endeavors to build its merchant 
fleets, enhance the competitiveness of its shipping companies in the international 
shipping marketplace, and boost the economic efficiency of its shipping industry. 
Hence, one of the legislative purposes of the US antitrust exemption regime 
for ocean shipping is still to push the development of its shipping sector. Since 
its maritime policies have not been changed significantly, the corresponding 
shipping competition laws are not reformed systematically, but only amended, 
when necessary after investigations, so as to be attuned to the change of shipping 
practice. 
The following paragraph will take the antitrust exemption for liner conferences 
as an example. After examining and reviewing the antitrust exemption for liner 
conferences through holding public hearings, conducting market surveys and other 
means,36 the EU asserts that at the time when the shipping economy is mature, the 
negative impact of such exemptions has outweighed the contributions it made to 
the development of the shipping economy. That is because the conferences earn 
profits by taking advantage of their dominant position and become more ambitious 
36      Xu Jun, On the EU’s Review of the Antitrust Exemption for Liner Conferences, China 
Oceans Law Review, No. 2, 2005, p. 202. (in Chinese)
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2015 No. 1)440
to acquire monopoly profits. Thus, the destruction to the competitive structure of 
the shipping market and the harm to the consumers caused by the resulting moves, 
such as controlling freight rates by agreement and collecting surcharges arbitrarily, 
have far outweighed their contribution to the boosting of the shipping economy. 
Therefore, the EU decided to repeal the antitrust exemption for liner conferences. 
Nevertheless, a strategy for smooth transition has been chosen by the US shipping 
legislation. Believing that its shipping economy is not sufficiently mature to repeal 
the antitrust exemptions for liner conferences, the US reserves such exemptions 
in its legislation, but it also imposes strict limitations on the exemptions through 
legislative and law enforcement measures, so as to minimize the negative impact. 
The question whether or not the US will repeal the exemption in the future should 
be determined by practice and a review of its impact on the shipping economy. 
Though in different stages of reforms, both the EU and the US acknowledge 
the positive role played by the antitrust exemptions for new business frameworks 
of cooperation between liner services operators (such as consortia agreements and 
consortia), except those fixing freight rates and controlling capacity, and contend 
that the above mentioned agreements and new modes of joint operations may 
benefit consumers, rather than distorting the shipping market and the relevant 
competition environment. Additionally, acknowledging such agreements and 
new modes in legislations also offers positive guidance to actual practice. For 
example: guiding the shift from rate-setting and capacity-controlling agreements to 
cooperation agreements on sharing of sailing schedules, cargo space, port rotation 
and operation of terminals, and even the shift from liner conferences to new 
business frameworks of cooperation between liner services operators like consortia 
and shipping alliances. The author argues that such guidance enables the legislation 
to be attuned to the development in practice, and provides an alternative means to 
repealing or restricting antitrust exemptions for liner conferences. Therefore, we 
may learn some valuable lessons from it.  
III. A Review of the Legislative Status of the Antitrust
       Exemption Rules for Ocean Shipping in China 
Current competition laws for the shipping industry in China chiefly consist 
of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter 
“Anti-Monopoly Law”), Law of the People’s Republic of China against Unfair 
Competition, and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International 
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Ocean Shipping (hereinafter “RIOS”). General competition rules also apply to the 
shipping industry, despite its uniqueness. China still lacks an independent legal 
system regulating competition in the shipping sector to authorize preferential 
treatment to the sector. China fails to lay down any express provisions concerning 
antitrust exemptions for ocean shipping. However, the author argues that an early 
form of the antitrust exemption regime can be identified in the relevant provisions 
envisaged in RIOS and the Anti-Monopoly Law, notwithstanding the ambiguity of 
such provisions and the immaturity of the legal system. 
Article 22 of RIOS provides the filing procedures for the liner conference 
agreements, operation agreements, freight agreements and other agreements invol-
ving Chinese ports entered into by and between international liner services opera-
tors.37 Further, Article 35(1)38 prescribes that such agreements filed should not 
contain any clause impairing fair competition, otherwise the competent transporta-
tion authority under the State Council may, in line with its authority or as requested 
by the interested persons, conduct investigations on such agreements. If it is found 
that such agreements do include any clause impairing fair competition, the relevant 
operators may be penalized in accordance with Article 40 of RIOS.39 Where any 
international liner services operators fail to file the above mentioned agreements as 
required, the competent transportation authority under the State Council is entitled 
37     Article 22 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International Ocean 
Shipping: Where the international liner services operators conclude any liner conference 
agreement, operation agreement, freight agreement or other agreement between themselves, 
they shall submit the copy of the agreement to the competent transportation authority under 
the State Council for filing within 15 days from the day on which the agreement is made.
38    Article 35 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International Ocean 
Shipping: The competent transportation authority under the State Council may, based on the 
request of the interested persons or its own decision, conduct investigations with respect to 
the following situations: 1) The liner conference agreement, operation agreement, freight 
agreement or other agreement signed between the international liner services operators 
may impair fair competition …4) Other actions that may impair fair competition on the 
international ocean shipping market.
39    Article 40 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International Ocean 
Shipping: After an investigation ends, the investigation departments shall make the 
investigation conclusion, and notify the person under investigation and the interested 
persons in writing. With respect to those impairing fair competition, the investigation 
departments may take prohibitive and restrictive measures such as ordering the amending 
of relevant agreements, restricting the number of scheduled flights of a liner, suspending the 
rate books or the acceptance of filing of freight rates, and ordering regular submission of 
relevant materials, etc.
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to impose penalty on such operators in accordance with Article 48 of RIOS.40 
The provisions listed above show that RIOS prescribes the filing of agreements 
between international liner services operators, the penalty imposed on failure 
to file, and the investigation and penalty on any filed agreement impairing fair 
competition. In other words, RIOS allows monopolistic behavior under horizontal 
agreements between international liner services operators if such agreements are 
filed with the competent authorities; however, it fails to expressively state whether 
such a category of “agreement” may enjoy antitrust exemption or not. In addition, 
the Decision of the State Council on Repealing and Amending Some Administrative 
Regulations, issued by the State Council in 2003, has cancelled the paragraphs, 
as contained in Article 24 of RIOS,41 concerning the review of the merger and 
acquisition agreements entered into by and between international liner services 
operators.42 Therefore, any mergers or acquisitions between international liner 
services operators of China or those between international liner services operators 
of China and international liner services operators of foreign States may not be 
submitted to the Ministry of Transport for review. It can be concluded that RIOS 
recognizes and acknowledges concentration of some international liner services 
operators if fair competition is not jeopardized. Nevertheless, like monopolistic 
behaviors by agreement, such operators are not granted antitrust exemption by 
RIOS clearly. 
40    Article 48 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International Ocean 
Shipping: If a party fails to go through the procedures for record as prescribed in these 
Regulations, he shall be ordered to complete the procedures as prescribed in these 
Regulations for record within a limited period by the competent transportation authority 
under the State Council or the competent transportation authority under the relevant local 
people’s government authorized by it; anyone failing to make up the procedures within the 
limited period shall be fined no less than 10,000 Yuan but no more than 50,000 Yuan, and 
the party’s corresponding qualifications shall be cancelled.
41    Article 24 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International Ocean 
Shipping: In case of merger or purchase between international shipping operators, the 
agreement on merger or purchase shall be submitted to the competent transportation 
authority under the State Council for examination and approval. The competent transpor-
tation authority under the State Council shall, within 60 days from the day of receiving 
the agreements on merger or purchase submitted by the international shipping operators, 
make the examination according to the policies of the State on the development of the 
international ocean shipping industry and the competition on the international ocean 
shipping market, make the decision on whether to grant approval or not, and shall notify the 
international shipping operators concerned in writing.
42     Order No. 638 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China: Decision of the State 
Council on Repealing and Amending Some Administrative Regulations, at http://www.gov.
cn/zwgk/2013-07/26/content_2456151.htm, 29 July 2014. (in Chinese)
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The paragraphs above indicate that signs of antitrust exemption rules are seen 
in some provisions of RIOS. RIOS does not prohibit relevant monopolistic beha-
viors, yet it fails to grant antitrust exemptions in any explicit way. These ambiguous 
provisions show the impreciseness of the legislative system, and also cause 
inconvenience to judicial practices. 
Does the Anti-Monopoly Law clearly encompass antitrust exemption rules or 
constitute a systematic legal system? The answer is negative. The Anti-Monopo-
ly Law merely mentions, in some provisions, the circumstances where antitrust 
laws are inapplicable. For example, the Anti-Monopoly Law’s Chapter 2, Article 
15 43 and Chapter 4, Article 28,44 prescribe the circumstances where monopoly 
agreements and concentration of business operators are exempt from complying 
with certain provisions. Specifically, Chapter 4, Article 28, provides that if the 
business operators can prove either that the favorable impact brought about by their 
concentration obviously outweighs its adverse impact, or that the concentration 
meets the public interests, such concentration may not be prohibited upon the 
approval of the competent authorities. As a matter of fact, this article fails to 
directly acknowledge any monopolistic conducts of business operators. It only 
offers conditional exemptions to certain monopolistic conducts which contribute 
43     Article 15 of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China: Where the business 
operators can prove that a monopoly agreement reached by them falls under any of the 
following circumstances, the monopoly agreement shall be exempt from Articles 13 and 
14 of this Law: 1. for the purpose of improving technologies, researching, and developing 
new products; 2. for the purpose of upgrading product quality, reducing costs, improving 
efficiency, unifying product specifications or standards, or carrying out professional 
labor division; 3. for the purpose of enhancing operational efficiency and reinforcing 
the competitiveness of small and medium-sized business operators; 4. for the purpose 
of realizing public interests such as conserving energy, protecting the environment and 
providing disaster relief, etc.; 5. for the purpose of mitigating the severe decrease of sales 
volume or obviously excessive production during economic recessions; 6. for the purpose 
of protecting the justifiable interests of the foreign trade or foreign economic cooperation; 
or 7. other circumstances prescribed by the law or the State Council. Where a monopoly 
agreement falls under any of the circumstances prescribed in Items 1~5 and is exempt 
from Articles 13 and 14 of this Law, the business operators shall also prove that such an 
agreement shall not substantially restrict competition in the relevant market and can enable 
the consumers to share the benefits from the agreement.
44     Article 28 of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China: Where the concen-
tration of business operators will or may eliminate or restrict competition, the Anti-
monopoly Law Enforcement Agency under the State Council shall make a decision to 
prohibit the concentration. However, if the business operators can prove either that the 
favorable impact of the concentration on competition obviously outweighs the adverse 
impact, or that the concentration meets the public interests, the Anti-monopoly Law 
Enforcement Agency under the State Council may decide not to prohibit the concentration.
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towards economic or public interests, subject to the relevant review process. 
Furthermore, the layout of Chapter 4 indicates that Article 28 is only supplemental 
to the antitrust regulations on concentration of business operators, and the brief 
mention of exceptions to application merely add some supplemental information 
to the chapter. In fact, such a brief mention does not specify the persons which 
may enjoy the exemption, the conditions attached to the exemption, the scope of 
exemption or the relevant procedures. In this connection, it is not elaborate enough 
to set up the antitrust exemption regime. Nonetheless, since the ocean shipping 
industry fails to meet the conditions for block exemptions as specified in Article 
7(1) of the Anti-Monopoly Law,45 the industry should be regulated by this law. In 
this sense, the legal foundations supporting antitrust exemption for liner services 
operators, among others, may be found in the Anti-Monopoly Law. Nevertheless, it 
is doubtful and questionable whether the simple clause on exceptions to application 
under the Anti-Monopoly Law can meet this end. 
Would the Shipping Act of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “Ship-
ping Act”), under drafting, change the legislative status of the antitrust exemp-
tion rules for the shipping sector by further laying down systematic exemption 
rules? The academic community has yet to reach a consensus on the question, 
mainly due to their disagreement on the inapplicability or applicability of the Anti-
Monopoly Law, in whole or in part, to the competition in the shipping market.46 
The Shipping Act, 2004 (Draft for Review), chooses to formulate competition rules 
on the shipping market which are independent from general competition laws. 
It regulates the abuse of dominant position in the market, low price competition 
aiming to squeeze out competitors and monopolistic conducts by agreement, and 
expressively grants conditional exemptions to agreements, decisions and concerted 
45     Article 7(1) of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China: With respect to the 
industries controlled by the State-owned economy and concerning the lifeline of national 
economy and national security or the industries lawfully enjoying exclusive production and 
sales, the State shall protect these lawful business operations conducted by the business 
operators therein, and shall supervise and control these business operations and the prices 
of these commodities and services provided by these business operators, so as to protect 
the consumer interests and facilitate technological advancements. However, the shipping 
industry is neither controlled by the State-owned economy or concerns the lifeline of 
national economy and national security, nor lawfully enjoys exclusive production and sales, 
therefore, it cannot be given a block exemption based on this article. 
46    Restarting the Formulation of the Shipping Act Will Maintain the Order of the Shipping 
Market, at http://info.jctrans.com/news/hyxw/2010918922407.shtml, 4 August 2014. (in 
Chinese) 
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practices of the members of one or more liner conferences, as well as pooling 
agreements between shipping companies.47 In this way, the antitrust exemption 
rules for the shipping sector are specified, which is a symbol of the progress of 
shipping legislations. However, this Draft for Review fails to cover all the forms 
of monopolies existing in the shipping sector. Focusing on the regulation of and 
exemptions for monopoly by agreement, it neglects monopoly by conduct, which 
should be covered. 
Based on the statements above, the author maintains that the Shipping Act to 
be promulgated should be consistent with the Anti-Monopoly Law, specify and 
further improve the antitrust exemption rules of China by drawing lessons from 
the EU and the US reforms in this regard and abandon the provisions scattered in 
RIOS. 
IV. Lessons for China’s Shipping Legislation from the
      Reform of Antitrust Exemption Regimes in 
      the EU and the US
A. To Adopt Maritime Policies That Are Steadily Developing and
    Establish the Antitrust Exemption Regime for Ocean Shipping 
    through Legislation: a Perspective from the Current Status 
    of China’s Shipping Economy
As stated above, the EU is more radical than the US in its reform of antitrust 
exemption regime for the shipping sector. The US has adopted a strategy aiming 
to enable a steady transition for its shipping legislation, since it believes that its 
shipping economy is not strong enough to repeal the antitrust exemption for freight 
rate agreements (such as liner conferences), and freight and capacity agreements 
between shipping companies. With regard to the shipping economy of China, 
the statistics of WTO show that the ocean shipping services for import trade in 
China account for 4.5% of those worldwide, and approximately 2/5 of those in 
the EU, and that such services for export trade in China account for 2.6% of those 
47    Chapter VI Market Competition Rules for Waterway Transport of the Shipping Act of the 
People’s Republic of China (Draft for Review), August 2004. 
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worldwide, and 1/6 of those in the EU.48 Additionally, affected by the international 
environment, the ocean shipping industry of China has undergone a continuous 
downturn after suffering a huge loss. In other words, in the context of the economic 
depression worldwide, the shipping sector of China is caught in a perfect storm, 
therefore it is difficult for it to cut loss short.49 The situation ameliorated in 2013; 
however, due to the continuous market recession, the shipping sector is still experi-
encing great losses.50 The figures above indicate that the shipping economy of 
China is not mature and is much weaker than that of the EU. In this connection, the 
shipping legislation of China, taking the boosting of shipping economy as its first 
priority, should encourage shipping companies to increase investment in capacity 
and recognize their role in stabilizing the shipping services market by reaching 
agreements on rate setting without serious prejudice to fair competition. 
Moreover, the ever deepening of Chinese economic reforms keeps pushing 
China’s small and weak shipping companies to take part in international competi-
tion, which will surely further influence Chinese shipping companies. Take 
Shanghai Free Trade Zone (SFTZ) as an example. The opening-up measures 
for ocean cargo transport promulgated by the authorities of SFTZ relaxes the 
restriction on the proportion of foreign capital in Sino-foreign joint or cooperative 
international shipping companies established in China,51 and allows the establish-
ment of wholly foreign-funded companies specializing in international ship 
management in China.52 This policy is highly likely to place Chinese shipping 
48   WTO: Transportation Service Imports/Exports: Share in World, at http://stat.wto.org/
ServiceProfile/WSDBServicePFReporter.aspx?Language=E, 7 August 2014.
49      An Analysis of the Recession of China’s Shipping Industry in 2012, at http://www.cnss.co
m.cn/html/oldspecial/2012/1019/qhdzt/index.html?pc_hash=G9tWLM, 8 August 2014. (in 
Chinese)
50     A Brief Analysis of the Continued Downturn of China’s Shipping Market in 2013, at http://
www.chinairn.com/news/20130425/174905771.html, 8 August 2014. (in Chinese)
51      Opening-up measures for ocean cargo transport (industry classification in national 
economy: G transport, warehousing and postal industry - 5521 ocean cargo transport): (1) 
the restriction on the proportion of foreign capital in Sino-foreign joint or Sino-foreign 
cooperative international shipping enterprises is relaxed, and the competent transportation 
authority under the State Council will be responsible for developing relevant trial measures 
for management; (2) non-five-star flag vessels owned by either Chinese-funded companies 
or Chinese-controlled companies have the priority to try to carry import and export 
containers between domestic coastal ports and Shanghai Port.
52    Opening-up measures for international ship management (industry classification in national 
economy: G transportation, warehousing and postal industries - 5539 other supporting 
services to water transport): wholly foreign-owned enterprises in international ship 
management are allowed to be established.
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companies, particularly the middle and small-sized ones, in a disadvantaged place 
in market competition. In the meantime, a review of the current operation of 
Chinese shipping companies reveals that most of such companies are operating 
in a relatively independent manner. With the continued acceleration of market 
opening, how should Chinese shipping companies contend with the new business 
frameworks of cooperation between international liner services operators which 
are so competitive? In this context, the joint operation of shipping companies 
offers an important solution to this dilemma. And the key to raise such companies’ 
competiveness is a breakthrough in the scope of their joint operation, and ways 
and levels of cooperation, complementing each other’s advantages and strengths. 
However, provisions are absent to specify whether such joint operation of shipping 
companies is lawful under the shipping legislation of China, and to what extent 
such operation is lawful. The mere provision with respect to the filing procedure 
and exceptions to application cannot constitute a perfect antitrust exemption 
regime. Rather, it will disrupt, to some extent, the regulation on joint operation in 
the shipping market, deprive the interested person of the legal foundation to settle 
disputes, and create such other issues. 
To sum up, given that the EU and the US are in different stages of reforming 
their antitrust exemption regimes, we should correctly review the current develop-
ment of China’s shipping economy, and specify and improve the antitrust exemp-
tion rules for ocean shipping after carefully investigating shipping practices and the 
current status of China’s shipping legislations. The following paragraphs are the 
proposals put forth to improve China’s antitrust exemption rules. 
1. To Specify and Improve the Antitrust Exemption Rules for 
Ocean Shipping and Lay down Systematic Provisions on the 
Antitrust Exemption Regime for Ocean Shipping
Antitrust exemption for ocean shipping is not a simple immunity granted to 
monopoly agreements between, and monopolistic conducts of, shipping companies 
or organizations, but a complete regime. It should include rules of substantive law, 
such as those concerning the form of monopoly eligible for exemption, conditions 
for exemption, scope of exemptions, limitations on the application of antitrust 
exemption rules for ocean shipping, and it should also contain rules of procedural 
law, such as the provisions regarding the application for exemption, acceptance, 
filing and review of such application, investigation and punishment of any violation 
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to the exemption limit.53 However, the antitrust exemption rules contained in RIOS 
are vaguely worded, single-faceted or fragmented,54 and the provisions with respect 
to exceptions to application under Anti-Monopoly Law are difficult to be applied 
and implemented.55 Still, the uniqueness of the shipping industry calls for the 
development of shipping competition rules independent from general competition 
rules; therefore, it is essential to set out express and systematic provisions concer-
ning the antitrust exemption regime in the Shipping Act. 
2. To Grant Antitrust Exemptions to Freight and Capacity Agreements 
with Strict Limitations Attached
The EU repealed the exemptions for liner conferences, considering its strong 
shipping economy. However, China’s shipping economy is far from mature. In 
this connection, China should draw more lessons from the maritime policy of 
the US to reserve the exemptions for liner conferences with strict restrictions 
attached. Still, the author contends that, the shipping legislation should not 
impose strict limitations on the application of antitrust exemption rules to all 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices of the members of one or more 
liner conferences, or only impose strict limitations on the application of antitrust 
exemption rules to freight or capacity agreements between members of one or more 
liner conferences. Instead, it should impose strict limitations on the application 
to all agreements concerning freight setting and capacity controlling. When such 
agreements are involved, the US requires the completing of a strict filing procedure 
for these agreements. In order to further curb their negative influences, China may 
implement a strict review procedure on a case by case basis. And an application 
for exemption for agreements should be rejected if they substantially undermine 
market competition, weaken management, harm trade, or play a minimum role in 
stabilizing market and shipping services and promoting investment in capacity. 
Also, similar to the provisions in the US, China may refuse to exempt those 
agreements which restrict and interfere too much with the right enjoyed by any 
member of a freight or capacity agreement (such as a liner conference) to directly 
53      Lyu Ming and Zhang Bo, Antimonopoly Exemption Rules in China’s Shipping Competition 
Law, Shipping Management, No. 3, 2005, p. 25. (in Chinese)
54    Wang Qiuwen, The Legislation of China’s Shipping Anti-monopoly Rules - Using EU 
Shipping Competition Law Reform for Reference, Journal of Ocean University of China 
(Social Sciences), No. 2, 2013, p. 30. (in Chinese)
55    Zhang Jing, Viewing Exemption of Antimonopoly Applied to Shipping Industry from the 
Dispute on Terminal Handling Charge (THC), Journal of Baoding University, No. 1, 2009, 
p. 55. (in Chinese)
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conclude transportation service contracts with shippers. 
3. To Grant a Loose Exemption to Consortia Agreements and 
New Business Frameworks of Cooperation between Liner Service Operators 
like Consortia and Shipping Alliances 
As mentioned above, the EU and the US are in different stages of their 
reforms, but both endeavor to guide the shipping sector in two directions. One is 
the shift from freight and capacity controlling agreements to consortia agreements, 
and the second is the shift from liner conferences to new business frameworks of 
cooperation between liner services operators like consortia and shipping alliances. 
That is because such consortia agreements and new business frameworks of 
cooperation do not operate jointly through fixing freight and controlling capacity, 
but through signing cooperation agreements on sharing of sailing schedules, cargo 
space, port rotation and operation of terminals. Thus, China may also follow 
the EU and the US in taking the following measures: to grant a loose exemption 
to consortia agreements and new business frameworks of cooperation between 
liner services operators like consortia and shipping alliances, and to have the 
applications submitted by the above-mentioned shipping companies for antitrust 
exemption registered and filed, which means that after the completion of the filing 
procedure as required by law, the consortia agreements between these shipping 
companies should come into force and be exempt from antitrust rules. Surely, at 
the stage of application, only a proforma review is required. The law enforcement 
agency should, as per its authority or the application submitted, conduct substantial 
investigation into the agreements only when they impair fair competition or the 
shipper’s interests. 
4. To Appoint a Law Enforcement Agency to Improve 
the Ex Post Supervision and Review Procedure 
FMC, a maritime law enforcement agency in the US, plays an essential role 
in law enforcement concerning antitrust for ocean shipping. It is unnecessary for 
China to follow this practice by setting up a similar special maritime committee. 
However, it should appoint a law enforcement agency in charge of antitrust for the 
shipping sector and the relevant exemptions, such as by setting up a department 
(bureau of maritime affairs) under the Ministry of Transport. In addition, it should 
also improve the ex post supervision and review procedure by supervising and 
reviewing the freight or capacity agreements which have been approved and the 
consortia agreements that have been filed. If such agreements do cause freight 
fluctuation or substantially affect the situation of market competition, the maritime 
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law enforcement agency should request an injunction for exemption from the court, 
and terminate the exemption for the agreements as authorized by the law. 
5. To Implement a Penalty Mechanism Combining Administrative 
Penalties with Civil Compensations 
In China, the existing legislation on maritime transport punishes any violation 
against the antitrust exemption rules and any behavior substantially damaging fair 
competition mainly through administrative means, including requiring the party 
concerned to go through the formalities, amend the contents of agreements, cease 
said violation, withdrawal of exemption for the party, imposition of fines, etc.56 
However, it neglects to consider the compensation paid to consumers, independent 
carriers and other aggrieved parties. In reality, the antitrust exemption regime for 
ocean shipping is established on the premise that the interests of cargo owners 
and independent carriers would be hurt to some extent. If liner services operators 
enjoying exemption breach the exemption rules and go beyond the limits defined 
by the antitrust exemption regime, leading to severe damages to the market 
competition order, then the loss suffered by the aggrieved parties certainly will 
be much greater. Therefore, China should improve its penalty system57 by taking 
into account the loss suffered by all aggrieved parties, and implement a penalty 
mechanism combining administrative penalties with civil compensations.
B. China’s Legislative Tendency with Respect to the 
     Antitrust Exemption Regime for Ocean Shipping: 
     a Perspective from Theoretical Considerations 
In today’s China, the shipping productivity is still not high. In this regard, 
efficiency is a key problem, especially for a developing country.58 Setting up 
an antitrust exemption regime for ocean shipping meets the requirements for 
developing China’s shipping economy. Nevertheless, it does not hamper the 
exploration of the legislative tendency with respect to the antitrust exemption 
regime for ocean shipping in the academia. 
56    Articles 40 & 48 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International 
Ocean Shipping.
57       Li Zhen, The Establishment of the Shipping Antitrust Exemption System in China, Collec-
ted Papers of the International Workshop on Maritime Law 2007, p. 405. (in Chinese)
58    Gu Gongyun, Economic Law, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2006, p. 81. 
(in Chinese)
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In the view of the author, the EU’s repealing of antitrust exemption for liner 
conferences, to a certain extent, indicates its legislative tendency towards the 
antitrust exemption for freight agreements. The antitrust exemption regime for 
ocean shipping is established after considering the inherent features of the shipping 
industry, and established for preventing excessive competition, stabilizing the 
shipping market, and ensuring the provision of quality liner servicers. However, 
as the EU’s shipping economy boomed, liner conferences along with other freight 
agreements started to control freight and capacity, collect surcharges arbitrarily and 
achieve high monopoly profits through discriminatory measures. Their destruction 
of the competitive structure of the shipping market and their harm to consumers 
have far outweighed their contribution to the shipping economy. Moreover, 
through implementing the antitrust exemption regime for ocean shipping for a 
long time, the shipper’s or cargo owner’s interests in having an equal status with 
the carrier, as a civil and commercial subject, has been injured. On account of 
such considerations, the EU decided to repeal the antitrust exemption for liner 
conferences. As for China, presently, the top priority of its shipping legislation 
remains boosting the development of its shipping economy. However, when 
China’s shipping productivity is raised rapidly, and the competitiveness of its 
shipping companies is strengthened greatly, people’s attention with respect to 
the shipping market will shift from efficiency to fairness and justice. Challenged 
by new business frameworks of cooperation between liner services operators, 
liner conferences and other freight agreements will have less room to make their 
contributions. In spite of that, their ambition to achieve monopoly profits is 
growing, and thus, they will struggle to gain profits by taking advantage of their 
dominant position through all possible means, which will further destabilize the 
shipping market, and substantially disturb the competition environment in the 
shipping market. Hence, repealing the antitrust exemptions for liner conferences 
and other freight agreements, and putting such agreements under the regulation of 
general competition laws are consistent with the tendency of shipping legislations. 
One of the tendencies of international maritime legislations is to exempt new 
business frameworks of cooperation between liner services operators like consortia 
agreements and consortia. This tendency is attuned to the current shipping practice. 
It should be noted that the current actions taken under consortia agreements and 
by consortia do not cover the joint fixing of freight rates, yet their joint operation 
through sharing of cargo space, port rotation and cooperative operation of terminals 
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will build an increasingly closer tie among liner services.59 During the course, 
shipping companies and business frameworks of cooperation are likely to fix rates 
jointly, which may harm the shipping market and business interests if not regulated 
by law. In this context, another legislative tendency with regard to antitrust 
exemptions for ocean shipping will emerge along with the diversification of the 
joint operation modes of shipping companies and the increasingly closer ties among 
liner services jointly operated. The shipping law enforcement agencies will subject 
any antitrust exemption for consortia agreements and new business frameworks 
of cooperation between liner services operators to strict scrutiny, and the shipping 
legislations will gradually place strict limitations on such exemptions. 
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59    Li Tiansheng, Exception to Antimonopoly in International Ocean Shipping Industry: An 
Economic Analysis of Law on THC Incident, Modern Law Science, No. 1, 2010, p. 103. (in 
Chinese)
